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AFIT/GSM/ENV/05M-03 
 
 
Abstract 
 
  The purpose of this research was to identify the current status of the use of the 
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) systems architecture products 
within the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) program offices.  There are regulatory 
requirements dictating the creation of DoDAF products as annexes to programmatic 
documentation, such as the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) 
requirement for systems architectures as annexes for acquisition milestone decision 
documentation.  In addition, the DoDAF itself identifies several products as being highly 
applicable for the development of acquisition strategies.  The research issue was to 
investigate the use or systems architectures, and particularly the DoDAF products, within 
the context of Air Force weapon systems acquisitions, as represented by ASC. 
  The research indicated two conclusions:  while programs required to follow the 
new acquisition processes are doing so, very few are employing systems architectures 
systematically, and at this point, at least within ASC, the benefits to acquisition program 
management personnel derived from an architectural context are not yet being realized.  
These conclusions result in several recommendations to ASC, the DoDAF Working 
Group, and the systems engineering community in general as to how to make systems 
architectures more a way of doing business within Air Force weapon system acquisitions 
efforts. 
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STATUS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE 
FRAMEWORK (DoDAF) IMPLEMENTATION WITHIN THE 
AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER (ASC) 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1  Background 
 
 In February 2004, the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) 
Volume 1 was released for implementation.  This was actually the 3rd version as the 
framework intended for all DoD systems acquisitions was expanded from the previously 
adopted Command, Control, Communications, and Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Architecture Framework used for the development of 
software intensive applications and systems.  The framework was part of a larger 
Department of Defense (DoD) effort to reinvigorate the systems engineering process 
within weapon system development and procurement.  The framework presents 
suggested formats for the modeling of systems architecture products useful at various 
stages of the weapon systems development process. 
 Systems architecting is not a new concept, having been employed in the 
development of software for close to a decade.  In 1996, Hilliard, Rice, and Schwarm 
defined architecture as:  “the highest level conception of a system in its environment” in 
a paper attempting to expand the architecture metaphor beyond the software development 
realm into the general systems engineering arena (25:1).  In 2001, the Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) further defined system architecture as “all the products 
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(including the enabling products) that are necessary to support the system and, by 
implication, the processes necessary for development, production/construction, 
deployment, operations, support, disposal, training, and verification” (13:7).   
 It has only been since the release of the DoDAF that a formal, specific framework 
has been in place for the development of systems architectures for military systems.   In 
addition to supporting the reemphasis on quality systems engineering within the military, 
the DoDAF products also align well with the DoD shift to capabilities-based weapon 
system development and the specifically.  However, there is always a temptation with a 
new tool to attempt to make it all things to all people.    
1.2  Research Problem 
 Acquisition professionals deal with a multitude of regulatory requirements when 
it comes to managing an Air Force weapon system program.  Depending on the 
Acquisition Category, the oversight and guidance may come from the Under Secretary of 
the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ).  With respect to acquisition program 
management, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) (which 
replaced the previous ‘Requirements Generation System’) calls for architecture views as 
annexes to required programmatic documentation.  Further, any system which 
communicates with other systems - and it seems hard to imagine systems being 
developed in today’s net-centric environment that do not have a requirement to interact 
with other systems - is required to include a net-readiness key performance parameter 
(NR-KPP) as one of its requirements.  Finally, the DoDAF itself identifies several views 
for program managers to make use of with respect to acquisition strategy development.   
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 In terms of formal policy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
(CJCSI) 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Instruction and 
CJCSI 6212.01, Interoperability and Supportability of National Security Systems, and 
Information Technology Systems directly impact program managers and engineers in 
program offices.  CJCSI 3170 establishes the policies and procedures for “a joint 
concepts-centric capabilities identification process” (8:1,2).  JCIDS calls for specific 
DoDAF architecture views as annexes to documents such as the Initial Capability 
Document (ICD), Capability Development Document (CDD), and Capability Production 
Document (CPD) required at each milestone of the development.  CJCSI 6212 “details a 
methodology to develop interoperability Key Performance Parameters…based on the 
format and content of the integrated architecture products described in the most current 
version of the DoDAF (17: 2-7).   
 In addition, the Architecture Framework Working Group (AFWG) identified 
eight DoDAF views as “highly applicable” to the development of a successful acquisition 
strategy (17:3-12).  Although not specifically addressed in policy, these views are 
intended to serve as an aid to the program manager in the actual management of the 
weapon system program.  System program office (SPO) personnel are deluged with 
advice and guidance on how best to successfully manage their weapon system acquisition 
programs. For example, “acquisition Reform” has been in the program manager’s lexicon 
for several years now.  Further, recently the emphasis has been on “Transformation” in 
all aspects of the DoD, with certain efforts aimed at cycle-time reduction of the weapons 
systems the warfighter requires.  How are systems architectures, and the DoDAF 
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specifically, being implemented “in the trenches” of USAF weapons systems 
acquisitions? 
1.3  Research Objective 
 The objective of this study is to examine the state of DoDAF systems architecting 
within ASC and make recommendations to improve the DoDAF use for acquisition 
program managers.  Specifically, the Defense Architecture Working Group is in the early 
stages of developing Version 2.0 of the DoDAF and should benefit from 
recommendations resulting from an analysis of the current implementation effort at the 
program office level.  Further, in a November 2004 presentation, the ASC Chief 
Architect made the following assertion:  “(Wings/Direct Reporting Groups) W/DRGs are 
underway in developing an ‘architectural understanding’ and the requisite technologies 
for new net enabled capabilities” (43:19).  Therefore, as a result of this study, the ASC 
Chief Architect will have better insight as how to improve DoDAF implementation 
across ASC. 
1.4  Thesis Overview 
 Chapter 2 will provide a definition of systems architecting, a discussion of the 
expected benefits of the DoDAF for acquisition program managers, and some potential 
pitfalls to implementation at the program office level.  The DoDAF is not the first, nor is 
it the only, systems architecting framework and Chapter 2 describes two others as well as 
the evolution of the DoDAF.  The next section introduces the DoDAF views and 
summarizes the expected benefits to weapons systems acquisition of implementing the 
DoDAF.  The final section of Chapter 2 provides an overview of previously identified 
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obstacles to using systems architectures, and the DoDAF specifically, for product 
development.  Chapter 3 describes the data collection and analysis methodology followed 
in the completion of this inductive study.  The results of data analysis outlined in Chapter 
3 are presented in the Findings and Conclusions sections of Chapter 4.  Finally, 
recommendations for the AFWG and the ASC Chief Architect are presented as well as 
potential areas for additional research in Chapter 5.
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2.  Literature Review 
2.1  Overview 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the publication of the DoDAF Version 1.0 
in 2004 was not the first foray into systems architecting as part of the overall systems 
engineering process.  This chapter provides a summary of the relevant literature 
pertaining to systems architectures, the DoDAF, and Air Force weapon systems 
applications.  The systems architecting community is not as vast as one might think.  
There are recognized experts who have written extensively as well as a few studies that 
look at the process, products, or outcomes of systems architecting.  The wide range of 
literature in this area is captured below. 
 First, the need for systems architectures as part of the overall effort to reinvigorate 
systems engineering practices within DoD weapon systems development programs is 
presented.  Following this introduction are several definitions and descriptions of systems 
architectures as background.  A brief primer on the Zachman framework and the IEEE 
Std 1471 is also presented as representative of other architecture frameworks.  This leads 
to the evolution of the DoDAF from C4ISR Architecture Framework to today with 
descriptions of the products and views that make up the framework.  Next is a discussion 
of the rationale behind using systems architectures, and particularly the DoDAF, in Air 
Force weapons systems acquisitions, presenting both general as well as regulatory 
guidance.  Finally, recent information concerning the application of the DoDAF in 
weapons systems acquisitions is presented with an emphasis on the 2003 Air Force 
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Inspection Agency (AFIA) Eagle Look report on architecture-based acquisitions.  The 
Eagle Look report will lead into the final section of this chapter, which deals with 
roadblocks or issues with using system architectures within Air Force weapon systems 
acquisition efforts that have been previously identified. 
2.2  Systems Architectures as Part of Systems Engineering 
 In February 2004, Michael Wynne, acting Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition Technology and Logistics (AT&L), issued a policy letter intended to begin 
the process of reinvigorating systems engineering (SE) within DoD weapon systems 
acquisitions.  Mr. Wynne stated the importance of rigorous systems engineering 
discipline in order to develop and maintain needed warfighting capability.  Specifically, 
the letter called for: 
   All programs responding to a capabilities or requirements 
  document, regardless of acquisition category, shall apply 
  a robust SE approach that balances total system performance 
  and total ownership costs within the family-of-systems,  
  systems-of-systems context.   
 
He went on to say, “collectively these actions will reinvigorate our acquisition 
community…thus assuring affordable, supportable, and above all, capable solutions for 
the warfighter” (44:1). 
 This emphasis on systems engineering was echoed at the Air Force level in 
comments made previously by both the Secretary of the Air Force Dr. James Roche and 
further by the Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Dr. Marvin Sambur.  In a 24 
June 2002 Air Force Times article, Dr. Roche stated in response to questions dealing with 
issues relating to recent Air Force acquisition program budget and schedule breaches, 
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“Increasingly, I’m convinced that the systemic problem is in the field of systems 
engineering” (10:3 ).  In his 9 April 2003 memo “Incentivizing Contractors for Better 
Systems Engineering”, Dr. Sambur said, “An immediate transformation imperative for all 
programs is to focus on the application of systems engineering principles and practices 
throughout the system life cycle” (40:4).  One systems engineering practice looked at to 
help in this reinvigoration is systems architecting. 
 An underlying rationale behind the Air Force’s insistence on improved systems 
engineering, is the increasing level of complexity inherent in current weapons systems 
development, an issue with inherent systems engineering implications.  Systems 
architectures offer a tool to deal with this issue.  In a systems architecture tutorial 
presented at the 2004 National Defense Industrial Associates (NDIA) Systems 
Engineering Conference, presenters from Kasse Initiatives, LLC stated: “Generating a 
system architecture as part of the systems engineering process can be seen as a deliberate 
approach to deal with the uncertainty that characterizes these complex, unprecedented 
systems” (26:6).  Further, Howard Eisner offers the following in his book, Essentials of 
Project and Systems Engineering Management, “Architecting a large-scale complex 
system is the centerpiece of systems engineering” (20:348).  Hilliard, Rice, and Schwarm 
go so far as to offer the architectural metaphor as an appropriate foundation for the 
systems engineering field as opposed to grounding systems engineering in other 
disciplines, ranging from set theory to systems theory to category theory to psychology 
(25:1). 
 Whether foundational or not, “the current interest in architecture is motivated by 
the desire to build our systems ‘faster, better, and cheaper’” (25:1).  “Faster, better, and 
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cheaper” has been a weapons systems development goal for years, with systems 
engineering being the methodology for converting requirements into systems through the 
DoD acquisition process.   “The system engineering effort is integrated into the systems 
acquisition process such that the activities associated with systems engineering support 
and strengthen the acquisition process” (13:23).  Just as systems engineering integrates 
with the acquisition process, “systems architecting is an essential part of the system 
engineering process and relies on many of the methodologies that have been developed 
over time” (19:41).  As with any entity, multiple perspectives have developed over time.  
These perspectives are, in some way, captured in the multiple definitions of systems 
architecture in the literature.  
2.3  Systems Architectures and Frameworks Defined 
 There are a number of definitions of what an architecture is in a systems context.  
Beyond the numerous definitions, there are several frameworks for systems architectures; 
these include the Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework, The Open Group 
Architecture Framework, the IEEE 1471 Standard, the Zachman Framework, and the 
DoDAF.  Each of these frameworks has its own definition of system architecture as well 
in addition to recommended format for products.  The similarities and distinctions 
between these different definitions are worth noting.  Irrespective of the differences in 
these definitions, the bottom line is that for Air Force weapon system acquisitions, the 
definition and framework that applies most is the DoDAF.   
 Beyond the three frameworks mentioned above, there are other widely accepted 
definitions of system architectures.  Dr. Mark Maier, author of The Art of Systems 
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Architecting, has a high-level conception of systems architectures and defines the process 
of architecting as “the art and science of developing systems solutions in ill-structured 
problem environments” (2:1).  Further, he believes “the concrete, deliverable products of 
the architect, therefore, are models (or abstracted designs) of the system” (33:18,139).  
This high-level perspective is shared by Hilliard et. al., who stated:  “Systems are situated 
in their environments.  An architecture reflects the whole system in response to that 
environment” (25:1). 
 NASA’s definition deals with functions and their interactions:  “How functions 
are grouped together and interact with each other.  Applies to the mission and to both 
inter- and intra-system, segment, element, and subsystem” (20:249).  The Defense 
Acquisition University has the following definition that seems all-inclusive: 
  The System Architecture identifies all the products  
  (including enabling products) that are necessary to  
  support the system and, by implication, the processes 
  necessary for development, production/construction,  
  deployment, operations, support, disposal, training, and 
  verification. (13:7) 
 
 Other definitions deal with architectures role in the design of the system.  Howard 
Eisner, author of Essentials of Project and Systems Engineering Management, believes 
architecting is “fundamentally a design or synthesis process” and defines architecture as 
“an organized top-down selection and description of design choices for all the important 
system functions and subfunctions, placed in a context to assure interoperability and the 
satisfaction of system requirements” (20:347,273).  In his book, The Engineering Design 
of Systems Models and Methods, Dennis Buede defines an operational architecture as 
providing 
 10
  A complete description of the system design, including 
  the functional architecture allocated to the physical  
  architecture, derived input/output, technology and system- 
  wide, trade off, and qualification requirements for each  
  component… and complete documentation of the design 
  and major design decisions. (6:246) 
 
Finally, Lawrence McCaskill believes the Federal Chief Information Officer Council’s 
definition is clearer regarding what architectures are, and their intended use: 
  A strategic information asset base, which defines the 
  mission, the information necessary to perform the mission 
  and the technologies necessary to perform the mission, and 
  the transitional processes for implementing new  
  technologies in response to the changing mission needs.  
  (37:3) 
 
 These definitions, however distinct, all present an architecture as a representation 
of a system that facilitates the transition from user/customer concept to actual hardware 
or software implementation.  Whether high-level and abstract or extremely detailed and 
technical, the point is still the same:  communicate the requirements, design, and 
constraints involved with the development of the system.  Hilliard et. al. sum it up: “An 
effective architecture shows how to build a system to satisfy clients’ needs, in the context 
of that client’s goals and vision” (25:3).  In order to achieve some consensus, frameworks 
have been developed to provide some structure to the architecting process.   
 Three frameworks for architectural representation include the Zachman Enterprise 
Architecture Framework, the IEEE 1471 Standard, and the DoDAF.  John Zachman 
created and published a Framework for Enterprise Architecture in 1987 and extended it 
for broader applications in 1992 (45:5).  IEEE Std 1471-2000 IEEE Recommended 
Practice for Architectural Description of Software-Intensive Systems was published in 
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October 2000 following five years of development.  And “in the early 1990s the DoD 
undertook the development of an architecture framework for Command, Control, 
Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
systems” (33:223) which has evolved into the DoDAF. 
 The Zachman Framework. 
   In his article, “Architecture, Enterprise Architecture, Frameworks, and 
Processes”, Kevin Kreitman describes the Zachman framework as “perhaps the oldest 
and most extensive framework in use today” (27:12).  The Zachman framework consists 
of six categories along the horizontal axis (data, function, network, people, time, and 
motivation) and five categories along the vertical axis (scope, business model, system 
model, technology model, and detailed representations).  Although designed for 
enterprise applications such as reengineering, David Brown wrote in the Spring 2000 
Acquisition Review Quarterly that “the Zachman framework provides an excellent 
template for developing the architecture of just about anything” (5:125).  Further, in 
Brown, Zachman defines architecture as “that set of design artifacts, or descriptive 
representations, that are relevant for describing an object such that it can be produced to 
requirements as well as maintained over the period of its useful life” (5:122).  Brown also 
believes “the Zachman framework can make important contributions to acquisition 
reform” (5:125). 
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 IEEE Standard 1471. 
 “In April 1995 the IEEE Software Engineering Standards Committee (SESC) 
convened an Architecture Planning Group (APG) to study the development of an 
architecture standard for software-intensive systems”.  Their final report was presented in 
1996, followed by the IEEE Architecture Working Group holding bi-monthly meetings 
from 1996 to 1999 (24:4).  This resulted in the publication of IEEE 1471 Standard 1471 – 
2000, Recommended Practice for Architectural Description of Software-Intensive 
Systems in 2000.  “IEEE 1471 establishes a set of content requirements on an 
architectural description – a collection of products to document an architecture” (23:1).  
The IEEE Definition of architecture, “the highest level (essential, unifying) concept of a 
system in its environment” (22:4), however vague, is still considered by many the 
archetypical definition.  Mark Maier offers the following critique of the 1471 effort: 
  The 1471 project was intended to codify the areas of 
  Community consensus on architecture description.  In  
  the end , consensus only developed around a framework 
  of views and viewpoints and an organizing structure for 
  architecture descriptions, but there was no prescription of 
  any particular views. (33:230) 
 
Even before the publication of the standard, Hilliard, Rice, and Schwarm offered a 
proposal in 1996 to extend the architectural metaphor beyond software engineering to the 
field of systems engineering in general. 
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 The Evolution of the DoDAF. 
 It is this broadening of perspective that characterizes the evolution of the DoDAF 
from a software and C4ISR-intensive system framework to one that applies now to all 
weapon systems development.  As Maier recounts:  
  In the early 1990s the DoD undertook the development of 
  an architecture framework for Command, Control,  
  Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance,  
  and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.  The stated goal for 
  this project was to improve interoperability across  
  commands, services, and agencies by standardizing how  
  architectures of C4ISR systems are represented. (33:223) 
 
The Architecture Working Group (AWG) published version 1.0 in June 1996 and version 
2.0 in December 1997; version 2.0 is commonly referred to as the C4ISR Architecture 
Framework (CAF) (33:223-224).  An early 1998 Joint Staff memorandum mandated the 
CAF for all C4ISR architecture descriptions (17:1-6). 
 The DoD broadened the application of the framework beyond C4ISR systems 
based on the utility of the CAF and both Federal (Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, etc.) and 
DoD policy encouraging the use of architectures (17:1-6).  The result was the publication 
in 2004 of the DoDAF Version 1.0 Volumes I and II.  The stated purpose of the DoDAF 
Version 1.0, is “to provide guidance for describing architectures for both warfighting 
operations and business operations and processes” (17:1-1).  DoDAF Volume I defines 
architecture as:  “the structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and 
guidelines governing their design and evolution over time” (17:1-1).  Even though the 
ASC Chief Architect defined architecture in his November 2004 presentation on Network 
Enabled Warfare, as “a systematic, rigorous, reproducible methodology for capturing, 
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organizing and communicating data about complex systems to support analysis” (43:29), 
the DoDAF definition is the one used and implied throughout this study. 
 Description of the DoDAF. 
 The DoDAF consists of multiple products known as views.  There are four types 
of views, the All Views, Operational Views, Systems Views, and Technical Standards 
Views.  Several of these views are collected in what is called an “integrated architecture” 
referred to extensively in the JCIDS documentation.  These are the architecture products 
referred to throughout this research effort. 
 DoDAF Volume Two defines architecture products as:  
  Those graphical, textual, and tabular items that are  
  developed in the course of gathering architecture data, 
  identifying their composition into related architecture  
  components or composites, and modeling the  
  relationships among those composites to describe  
  characteristics pertinent to the architecture’s intended  
  use. (18, 2004:1-1) 
 
Thus, architecture products can take the form of Power Point charts, Excel spreadsheets, 
tables and charts, as well as any other graphical product that conforms to the standard 
above.  The DoDAF is careful not to specify a certain development methodology.  In 
fact, it is purposely intended to be methodology independent (12).   
 There are four categories of views within the DoDAF:  the Overview and 
Summary, Operational, Systems, and Technical Standards Views.  The All Views 
category captures essential overview information about the architecture. 
  The Overview and Summary (AV-1) is essential for  
  documenting the assumptions, constraints, and limitations 
  that may affect high-level decision processes involving… 
  architecture.  AV-1 also identifies the approving authority, 
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  the completion date, and records level of effort and costs  
  required to develop the architecture as well as the time  
  frame covered and the organizations that fall within the 
  scope of the architecture. (17:3-10) 
 
“The Operational View (OV) describes the tasks and activities necessary to successfully 
perform the mission, the participating nodes, and the associated information exchanges” 
(17:3-2).  Further, “OV descriptions are useful for…defining the operational 
requirements to be supported by resources and systems” and “a pure OV is materiel 
independent” (17:3-2).  In order to deliver a weapon system, the tasks and activities 
modeled in the OVs are allocated to systems, which are themselves modeled in Systems 
Views.  “The Systems View (SV) describes the systems of concern and the connections 
among those systems in context with the OV” (17:3-3).  Finally, “the Technical 
Standards View (TV) describes a profile of the minimum set of time-phased standards 
and rules governing the implementation, arrangement, interaction, and interdependence 
of systems” (17:3-4).  The DoDAF defines an integrated architecture (a term used 
throughout JCIDS and other documents) as the AV-1, AV-2, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, SV-1, 
and TV-1, at a minimum) (17:1-5).  The 26 views are summarized in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 DoDAF Views         (DoDAF, 2004) 
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2.4 The DoDAF and Air Force Weapon System Acquisition 
 
 The views mentioned above are intended to aid the weapon system designer in 
translating requirements into capability to the warfighter.  Weapon systems design and 
development is the purview of program managers and engineers within Air Force 
acquisition program offices.  Beyond the notional benefits to systems engineering, the 
DoDAF Working Group prescribed several views as beneficial to the program manager 
in acquisition strategy development.  Further,  as Zinn noted, with the Clinger-Cohen Act 
and Office of Management and Budget circular A-130, “the use of architectures had not 
only been recommended but essentially made law” (46:17), at least for information 
technology systems.  In addition, JCIDS, NR-KPP, and Information Support Plan 
guidance calls for the production of systems architecture products as well.  These are 
requirements program office personnel must meet. 
 The most basic task the acquisition program manager has, albeit far from a trivial 
one, is to translate operational requirements into a contractual specification that will 
result in the development of a system meeting the user’s needs.  This is the core 
capability systems engineering efforts provide.  Systems engineering has become more 
and more complicated as the level of complexity of the systems under development 
increases as well as the requirements for these systems to interact also increase.  
Therefore, “the architectural approach is needed most as systems become more complex 
and multi-disciplinary, and for systems customized to individual clients” (3:1).  The 
DoDAF Working Group stated:   
  Using an integrated architecture ensures that the system to 
  be acquired is addressed in the context of a whole  
  environment rather than a separate entity.  The architecture  
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  can support identification of operational dependencies  
  outside the sphere of the specific system under  
  development. (17:3-21) 
 
 Further In a 2002 paper, Dr, Harry Crisp related how systems architectures can 
aid in this effort, stating:  “Architectures provide the framework for FoS/SoS (Federation 
of Systems/Systems of Systems) systems engineering and acquisition”, a feeling echoed 
by Dr. Steven Long (see Figure 2 below) as well as the Air Force Chief Architect, Dr. 
Alexander Levis (12:86).  This belief is further outlined in the Architecture Playbook 
developed by the Enterprise Integration Forum Architecture Process Team as a guide for 
the use of systems architectures:  “an architecture-based approach can provide a formal 
methodology and associated language for determining and representing similar 
information about complex system (system-of-systems) and relationship to their 
environments” (19:1).   
 Systems architectures are another tool in the program office tool box that, when 
combined in an overall management and execution effort, can lead to success: 
  Together, integrated architectures, executable  
  architectures, analytical tools and methods render  
  quantitative actionable information, which, in turns  
  supports funding decisions, acquisitions, system  
  engineering, and investment decisions. (39:11) 
 
Architectures are also a tool designed to aid in program management.  Program managers 
“need to be able to analyze these architectures to locate, identify, and resolve definitions, 
properties, facts, constraints, inferences, and issues both within and across architectural 
boundaries that are redundant, conflicting, missing, and/or obsolete” (39:3).  In fact, this 
tool can be considered necessary, “creating a system’s C4ISR/DoDAF architecture is one 
of several necessary activities to advance from a mission concept to reality” (32:10). 
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Figure 2 Architectures as Part of Development Process (Long, 2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In DoDAF Volume I, the DoDAF Working Group identifies eight views as 
“highly applicable” to the development of a weapon system acquisition strategy.  
Systems architecting can be very useful in this early stage of the development effort.   
  The role of systems architecting in the systems acquisition  
  process depends upon the phase of that process.  It is  
  strongest during conceptualization and certification, but  
  never absent.  Omitting it at any point, as with any part of  
  the acquisition process, leads to predictable errors of  
  omission at that point to those connected with it. (33:23) 
 
Figure 3 depicts the “Recommended Uses for Architectures” as identified by the DoDAF 
Working Group.  Notice, under ‘Acquisition Process’, the first line is Acquisition 
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Strategy.  There are eight views that are highlighted as “highly applicable” with another 
three as “often or partially applicable”.  In addition to these, Levis describes Dickerson 
and Soules’ proposal for the following products as useful for acquisition strategy 
development:  SV-8, SV-9, TV-2, and CV-6 (Capability Views never implemented in 
DoDAF) (31:5-62). 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Recommended Uses of Architecture      (DoDAF, 2004) 
 
 Figure 3 also highlights the JCIDS systems architecture requirements.  Notice that 
the views under the JCIDS header are not only “highly applicable”, but are also 
“specifically addressed in policy”; in this case CJCSI 3170.  In addition, DoD Instruction 
“Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” May 12, 2003 “defines how integrated 
architectures are to be used in the requirements and acquisition processes” (17:2-5).  
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“JCIDS implements a capabilities-based approach that better leverages the expertise of 
all government agencies, industry and academia to identify improvements to existing 
capabilities and to develop new warfighting capabilities” (7:A-1).  In fact, the assumption 
that “integrated architectures are the preferred method for describing operational, 
technical and systems interactions and assessing future capability needs” has been an 
underlying theme for the revised JCIDS documented in CJCSI 3170.01D (35:3). 
 Program managers attempt to get their system through the acquisition milestones 
to full production and sustainment.  In order to accomplish this, they are required to 
produce the appropriate documentation at each milestone review.  “Integrated 
architecture products must be included in mandatory appendixes for the ICD, CDD, and 
CPD” (17:2-7).  Further, mandatory integrated architecture products for CRDs (Capstone 
Requirements Documents) include AV-1, OV-2, OV-4, OV-5, OV-6C, SV-4, and SV-6 
(8:E-A-6). 
 In addition to the JCIDS requirements, architectures are also required 
documentation for Information Support Plans (ISPs – formerly C4I Support Plans) and as 
part of the documentation required to identify net-ready key performance parameters 
(NR-KPP).   Both Figures 3 and 4 (below) identify the architecture views required for 
ISP/C4ISP development.  According to Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
(CJCSI) 6212.01C, “all CDDs (Capability Development Documents) that exchange 
information will have a NR-KPP” which is “derived from a completed architecture and 
developed from” mandatory architecture products (see Figure 4 below) (9:F-1).  In fact, 
the instruction goes on to say “development of the NR-KPP begins with designing the 
architecture for the proposed system” (9:F-2).  
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Figure 4 JCIDS Documents/NR-KPP Products Matrix  (CJCSI, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 National Security Space (NSS) Acquisition Policy guidance is provided in NSS 
Acquisition Policy 03-01 and, although separate and distinct from the more general 
weapon systems acquisition guidance in the DoD 5000 series, emphasizes the use of 
systems architecture products.  “It is the responsibility of JCIDS and National Security 
Space Architect’s (NSSA) processes to develop integrated architectures and initial 
operational view (OV) products for NSS systems” (42:10).  Further, conducting system 
architecture development efforts and producing initial SV and TV architecture products 
is included in phase readiness review and entry criteria checklists (42: 35).  Systems 
architectures are therefore pervading all aspects of DoD weapon systems development. 
 In a presentation before the Software Technology Council in 2003, Thilenius and 
others presented the following statistic highlighting the increased role architectures are 
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playing in weapon system acquisition:  “Architecture products directly responsible for 
$1.17B in O3 POM” (41:26).  Therefore, as the Air Force, and indeed all of DoD moves 
to a more capability-based development process, systems architectures will continue to 
be prevalent.  This fact is highlighted by the increased interest in how architectures 
should integrate in the weapon system acquisition process. 
 In September 2003, the Air Force Inspection Agency published its findings during 
an Eagle Look investigation into architecture-based acquisition.  Submitted by the 
Electronic Systems Center, the purpose statement was to “assess the ability of the Air 
Force to integrate enterprise architecting into the acquisition process by identifying 
policy strengths and shortfalls, as well as enablers and impediments to integration” (2:no 
page).  The Eagle Look team interviewed key individuals involved with architectures 
from the following types of organizations (113 interviews, predominantly senior leaders 
– 70% were in the grade of Lt Col or higher for military and GS-15 and above for 
government civilians):  Secretary of the Air Force and Headquarters United States Air 
Force Functional Offices, Unified and Major Commands, Product Centers and Product 
Groups, and Department of Defense (DoD) Functionals and Program Offices.  The team 
found that “94% of the personnel in, or involved with, the acquisition process consider 
architectures (both warfighting and business) to be of significant value in improving how 
products or systems are acquired and sustained” (2:no page). 
2.5  Roadblocks to DoDAF Implementation Within Air Force Product Centers 
 
 In addition to the positive perceptions with respect to system architectures in 
acquisitions, the EAGLE LOOK team also identified several areas of concern.  There are 
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others experienced in systems architectures that have also recognized potential 
roadblocks to the successful implementation of systems architectures within Air Force 
weapon systems acquisitions.  At the 2004 Command and Control Research and 
Technology Symposium, Lawrence McCaskill offered his analysis of the DoDAF and its 
implementation.  Beyond the use of the DoDAF products, there are concerns about the 
views themselves.  One of the recurring critiques of systems architectures is their static 
nature, leading to the call for executable architectures.  Finally, there is a danger in 
program office personnel creating architectures for architecture sake.   
 AFIA EAGLE LOOK. 
 
 Interviewees responding to the 2003 AFIA Eagle Look investigation identified 
the following issues to be addressed in order to move to an acquisition system driven by 
architectures (see Table 1).   
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 Issues
Table 1 EAGLE LOOK Issues
  
1. Leadership may not sustain the focus needed to fully implement the architecture construct. 
2. A significant portion of the workforce was unconvinced that architectures are a valuable construct to pursue. 
3. Policy and guidance to implement an architecture-based acquisition process was insufficient. 
4. Organizationally- or functionally-centric, or ‘stovepiped’ processes will impede the move to an enterprise architecture-based system. 
5. 
Full integration of enterprise architecting into key Air Force and DoD processes, 
such as the CRRA (capabilities review and risk analysis) and the Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes, has not occurred. 
6. Air Force personnel lacked the needed education, training, and experience to effectively pursue enterprise architecting. 
7. Funding strategy was insufficient to accomplish this task 
 (AFIA, 2003) 
 
In addition, “the EAGLE LOOK team identified workforce attitude as a potential 
impediment to integrating architecture concepts into the acquisition business”, which is 
not surprising seeing as the team also found “the Air Force does not include architectural 
development skills as a core skill set for program managers” (2:16, 41). 
 Many EAGLE LOOK interviewees felt architectures were too information 
technology-centric, with one respondent stating “(Architecture) policy…doesn’t apply to 
weapon systems” (2:16, 67).  This latter feeling is echoed in the fact that the only 
mention of systems architecture products in the Interim Guidance Preceding Air Force 
Instruction 63-101, Capabilities Based Acquisition System is in the section outlining 
information technology as an important management consideration (14:20).  And finally, 
with respect to the integrated architectures JCIDS refers to, “none of the overarching 
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joint operational architectures are in place, so the Services continue to do what they’ve 
always done” (2:36).  
 McCaskill’s Study. 
 Lawrence McCaskill, an employee of Whitney, Bradley, & Brown, Inc., 
presented a paper, “Integrated DoD/C4ISR Architectures:  It’s not About the 
Framework…”, for the 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology 
Symposium in which he identified several concerns with the way architectures were 
being used.  His study set out to “clarify the overarching purpose of integrated 
architectures…and describe a methodology by which the architecture community can 
improve the process of developing and maintaining architectures” (37:1).  
 With respect to the CRRA integration issue identified in the EAGLE LOOK 
report, McCaskill found that due to architectures not having complete financial and 
scheduling information, architecture-based analysis in the CRRA “requires lots of 
manual processes to put together” (37:17).  Referring to acquisition program office 
personnel reactions to the requirement for architecture products, McCaskill stated:  “This 
process put the architectures at the wrong end of the acquisition chain; the architectures 
didn’t drive the requirements to create the respective systems – they ended up being the 
product of the system being built (and often, an afterthought, after the system had already 
been built)” (37:9).  Ultimately, McCaskill found “current efforts, especially with regard 
to C4ISPs/ISPs are ‘reinventing the wheel’ every time one of these requirements 
documents is created, thus creating semantic mismatches for the same information, and in 
the endgame, misusing resources” (37:16). 
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 Issues With the Products Themselves. 
 Despite the fact that the DoDAF has been embraced by the DoD as the best tool 
to add discipline, structure, and context to our new and modernized systems, there are 
some issues with the products used to represent the architecture.  There are issues with 
their comprehensive applicability or effectiveness for acquisition management, 
capability-based analysis, and systems engineering applications.  The United Kingdom 
(UK) is developing its own architecture framework, in part, to address deficiencies it sees 
in the DoDAF.  Members of the Joint Staff, specifically the J-8, have also expressed 
doubts concerning the utility of system architecture products for the capability-based 
analysis and decision-making they perform.  Another issue with the products themselves 
involves the ability to measure the level of functionality or capability identified in the 
architecture. 
 Hilliard et. al. questions how complete the DoDAF products are with respect to 
the types of analysis they are intended to aid.    
  It is tempting to prescribe predefined views (as the  
  DoDAF does), “however, we do not yet have enough  
  experience to prescribe these, or any, views for all  
  systems.  Sometimes, a system’s most critical architectural  
  concerns fall outside this familiar set. (25:4) 
 
Further, Dam and Long unearthed another issue with the completeness of the DoDAF 
architecture products.  In terms of comparison, there is no standard set of levels; for 
instance, how do I know I am at the same level of OV when looking at 2 architectures 
(12)?  And, in terms of engineering, Long, Macdonald, and Maley concur with the notion 
the DoDAF is less than complete, believing additional detail beyond that required to 
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generate the views is needed.  “Otherwise, the team performs ‘engineering by viewgraph’ 
which is well known as an inadequate approach for the design of complex systems” 
(32:3). 
 Maier has stated the following in terms of the systems engineering aspects of 
weapon systems acquisition: 
  One clear issue is that it (CAF) is often being used for  
  purposes for which it was not intended.  The goals, at least  
  as discussed in the CAF documentation, did not include  
  defining a standard that was complete with respect to an  
  acquirer’s concerns.  For example, there is no place in the  
  views for performance models, cost models, or other  
  management models.  Yet all those are clearly necessary  
  when the client is an acquirer and must make acquisition  
  decisions. (33:226)   
 
With respect to making acquisition decisions, the DoDAF has not improved upon this 
deficiency.  As such, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (MoD) is working on its 
own standard, the Ministry of Defense Architecture Framework (MoDAF).  The MoDAF 
builds on to the DoDAF with 12 additional views, including two new categories of 
views; Capability and Acquisition Views.  These additional views are intended “to 
handle temporal and other procurement aspects where the DoDAF…doesn’t cover these 
aspects” (36: M-5).  The ultimate goal is to develop “a common language set to describe 
systems and systems-of-systems” and obtain a “context for system procurement” not 
previously achievable (36:M-3).  Even though the intent of the DoDAF is to bring 
interoperability, consistency and cohesiveness to the development of new capabilities, the 
products from these tools impose an additional data and semantic interface that the 
requirements engineering and systems engineering teams must resolve” (32:3). 
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 In a 17 May 2004 presentation outlining concerns the J-8 Staff has with integrated 
architectures US Navy Captain Mike Mara declared architectures to be resource-
intensive and not as valuable as hoped as planning and decision-making aids.  He said, 
“Architectures tend to be brittle, static at best, or worse, outdated.  DoDAF architectures 
require significant fiscal and manpower resources to produce” and “architectures can not 
be produced or revised on a timeline that matches the tempo of analytic questions facing 
decision makers” (35:4).  In terms of utility and value, Mara said, “Most of the DODAF 
architecture views are not necessary to conduct capability-based assessments and do not 
include data needed to support this process.  Additionally, no architecture views capture 
the robust relationships between capabilities, attributes and metrics needed for capability-
based assessments” (35:4).  These beliefs have lead the J-8 to the conclusion that they 
“no longer assert that architecture is the preferred method” to “evaluate how well a 
system or system-of-systems attains a desired capability” (35:5). 
 An additional concern with the DoDAF products is their inability to provide 
information on the level of capability or effectiveness of the architecture modeled.  Mara 
also recognized this deficiency in a 2003 paper,  
  The framework only show(s) a binary relationship between 
  systems and operational activities – a system either has the 
  functionality or it doesn’t.  In reality, there needs to be  
  recognition and some assessment of how much functionality a  
  system has”. (34:9)  
 
McCaskill also noted architecture’s inability to provide measures of effectiveness:   
  While this answers the ‘first order’ question of ‘is there a  
  system being developed that answers the requirements of  
  the capability,’ it does not answer the question of ‘how  
  effective’ the FoS/SoS is in accomplishing this capability.   
  Thus, this only provides the ‘first step’ towards the  
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  analysis that the decision-maker will need to make  
  acquisition decisions” (37:14). 
 
 Executable Architectures. 
 
 One way to answer the ‘how effective’ question McCaskill brings up above is to 
run an executable model of the architecture and analyze the system/capability 
performance.  However, the DoDAF does not include an executable architecture among 
its products:  “There are currently no standards for the format or process for constructing 
executable architectures” (17: 7-2).  Issues of timing and latency, as well as outcome 
measures of effectiveness could be addressed with the development of executable 
architectures. 
 The need for executable architectures lies in the static nature of the DoDAF 
products.  “Static operational models only show that activities ‘must be capable of’ 
producing and consuming information.  They do not provide details on how or under 
what input/output conditions information is actually produced/consumed” (39: 8).  In 
another paper, Ring and others concluded:  “These static products…fail to provide a good 
vehicle for conducting detailed dynamic ‘behavioral’ analysis of how the systems are 
supposed to interact with each other” (17:3).  James Long describes the need for 
executable models as: “Static diagrams may or may not actually work, since in reality 
many of the processes interact with one another and functional decomposition can miss 
critical interfaces” and “simulation enables the execution of these models, thus ensuring 
that the design is executable (i.e., will work)” (12:125).  And, in his thesis dealing with 
the implementation of a specific architecture, Capt Gregory DeStefano noted that despite 
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the dynamic behavior captured in some of the DoDAF views (in particular the OV-6), 
“some vehicle is needed to take these products and put them into motion” (15:2-14).   
 Although the DoDAF does not include formats or processes for executable 
architectures, it does define what they are.  DoDAF Volume I defines executable 
architecture as “the use of dynamic simulation software to evaluate architectural models” 
(17:7-1).  These executable architectures would provide value to acquisition program 
office personnel, as stated by the Enterprise Integration Forum Architecture Process 
Team: 
  The derivation of an executable model of the architecture 
  from the three views and the associated integrated  
  dictionary, provides a basis for understanding the  
  interrelationships among the various architecture  
  products and establishes the foundation for  
  implementing a process for assessing and  
  comparing architecture. (19:41) 
 
There are efforts underway to address this issue and develop or improve existing discrete 
event simulators to have the capability to perform dynamic analysis of the capability or 
system under development.  In a recent Air Force Institute of Technology thesis, it was 
shown that the DoDAF architectures provide all the information required for any 
modeling and simulation required to analyze competing design decisions (46:91).  
However, at this point there are no well accepted methods for a program office engineer 
to execute an architecture. 
 Architecting for Architectures Sake 
 Irrespective of the issues with systems architecting as a systems engineering tool 
or with the DoDAF and its views, there is also the issue that the architecture becomes the 
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focus, as evidenced in the following caution from Jeffrey Harris, former Director of the 
National Reconnaissance Office: 
  Recent years have increased the focus on architectures… 
  While (this) is beneficial, it is easy to allow the architecture 
  and its processes to become the focus rather than the users’ 
  desired effects”. (21:47) 
 
The DoDAF Deskbook attempts to head off this issue by providing a notional six-step 
process that includes four steps before any architecture products are actually built (see 
Figure 5 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Architecture Development Process    (DoDAF Deskbook) 
Further, McCaskill also cautions that “while the Framework plays a large part in 
providing a common lexicon by which the primitives that compose integrated 
architectures are described, delving directly into ‘spreadsheets and boxologies’ misses 
the point of why we’re creating integrated architectures” (37:3).  It would be a shame for 
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those earnestly working on systems architectures in an effort to improve their systems 
engineering rigor, to lose focus on the reason for the system architecture and indeed the 
systems engineering work at all. 
 System architecture products are required by direction for Air Force weapon 
systems acquisition efforts.  The JCIDS process identifies capability requirements that 
evolve into the weapon systems that are developed in Air Force Materiel Command 
product centers.  These product centers employ program managers and engineers skilled 
in taking a user’s requirement and turning it into a hardware or software solutions, that is 
systems engineering.  The DoDAF provides a framework for capturing the early systems 
engineering work performed and communicating the complex interactions of the system 
or capability under development.  However, the DoDAF has not yet been universally 
accepted as a systems engineering tool and practice.  There are several obstacles to the 
full implementation of a systems architecture mentality within the trenches of Air Force 
weapon systems acquisition.
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3.  Data Collection and Analysis Methodology 
3.1  Overview 
 Chapter 2 summarized the literature supporting the notion that systems 
architectures are useful and valuable for Air Force weapon systems acquisitions.  
However, there were also several issues or roadblocks identified.  Chapter 3 lays out the 
methodology for investigating the level to which these obstacles have been overcome (at 
least within ASC).  This study is inductive in nature, relying on interviews with “people 
in the know” and critical analysis of the results.  First, the “people in the know” had to be 
identified – the population from which to collect data.  Then, the data was collected via 
structured interviews.  This data was collated and formatted for analysis of the results.  
This analysis involved grouping respondents by their level of DoDAF implementation.  
Along the way, significant additional information concerning systems architecting, the 
DoDAF, capabilities-based system development, and even the new ASC organizational 
structure was also collected.  
3.2  Research Design 
 This is a qualitative case study of the implementation of system architectures, 
specifically the DoDAF, within ASC.  Whereas the 2003 AFIA Eagle Look, described in 
Chapter 2, took a broad brush look at architectures in acquisition across the Air Force at a 
senior leader level, the focus here is collecting detailed information to determine the level 
to which the DoDAF has permeated throughout ASC to the program manager and 
engineer level.  Data was collected through interviews (and in rare cases e-mail 
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correspondence) with personnel representing the highest level of acquisition program 
management execution.  These interviews lead to follow-up interviews with specific 
program personnel within each Wing or DRG.  In total, 39 interviews were conducted. 
3.3  Data Collection Methodology 
 The data collected through these interviews was intended to provide a 
characterization of the level of system architecture work previously done, currently 
ongoing, or planned.  The questions posed during the interviews gathered information as 
to rationales behind decisions concerning architecture efforts within each organization.  
In addition, data was collected concerning the level of education, training, and general 
familiarity in systems architectures each person interviewed possessed.  In total, this data 
would be collated by program and then by Wing or DRG in order to portray an overall 
picture of systems architecting within ASC as a whole. 
 The interviews generally took no more than 30 minutes and were facilitated by a 
standard note-taker template.  Access to the interviewees was made possible through the 
ASC Commander’s Action Group and through personal connections with the Wing and 
DRG Executive Officers.  Each interviewee was assured that their individual identities 
would not be revealed.  Confidentiality is accomplished by reporting the responses tied to 
organizations rather than specific persons or even job titles.   
 Although no two interviews were exactly the same, the same basic questions were 
asked to all interviewees.  Example questions included: 
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 - Does your organization (Wing/DRG/Program, depending on the level of 
 authority of the person being interviewed) make use of the DoDAF systems 
 architecture framework/process? 
 - If yes; 
  -- To what degree do you make use of the architecture products during the  
  execution and management of your program? 
  -- Which views are more/less useful to you in executing your program? 
  -- Who creates the views; in-house (program office personnel and   
  contractors), outside contractor support, the user (Major Command)? 
  -- How much training or education do the people creating and reviewing  
  the architecture views have in the DoDAF and systems architecting, in  
  general? 
  -- What tools do you use to create the systems architecture views (Popkin,  
  Visio, Power Point, etc.)? 
 - If no; 
  -- Why not?  What is keeping your organization from adopting this  
  framework?   
  -- Does your organization employ another systems architecture   
  framework (IEEE 1471, Zachman, etc.)? 
  -- Do you have another method for capturing the output of your systems  
  engineering processes? 
 - How could systems architecting, and specifically the DoDAF, be more useful to 
 you? 
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 The population for this study was selected in order to best meet the research 
objective.  ASC provided a population experiencing the expansion of the role of the 
DoDAF.  The DoDAF is expanding the realm of systems architecting from C4ISR 
systems to all systems.  As such, studying the implementation at the Aeronautical 
Systems Center seemed appropriate.  The level of acceptance and use within ASC should 
serve as a barometer for overall acceptance of the DoDAF within Air Force weapon 
systems acquisition programs, which traditionally have not been dominated by networked 
C4ISR capabilities.   
 ASC was undergoing a significant reorganization.  In June 2004, ASC began 
operating under a wing, group, and squadron structure.  Over 40 separate program offices 
were organized into five acquisition systems wings and two direct reporting groups for 
fighter attack, long range strike, reconnaissance, mobility, agile combat support, special 
operations forces and training aircraft.  In January 2005, the structure was formally 
recognized (1:2).  The new structure is depicted in Figure 6.  ASC was the first product 
center to operationalize this reorganization with all the others soon to follow. 
 38
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Fighter 
Attack Sys  
Wing  
SOF Sys 
Group  
  
Mobility 
Sys Wing   
Recon 
Sys Wing   
 
Training 
Aircraft 
Sys Group 
F/A-22 Sys 
Pgm Office
 
Airborne 
Laser Sys 
Pgm Office
Int’l Sys 
Flight 
Det 3 Sys 
Squadron
Propulsion 
Sys 
Squadron 
Combat 
Electronics  
Sys 
Squadron 
 
Simulator 
Sys 
Group 
Aging 
Aircraft  
Sys 
Squadron 
 
T-38 Sys  
Squadron 
JPATS 
Sys 
Squadron 
T-1 Sys 
Squadron 
Human 
Sys Group 
 
Agile Combat 
Support Sys  
Wing   
GH Sys 
Group 
U-2 Sys  
Flight 
C-17 Sys 
Group 
767 Sys 
Squadron
LAIRCM 
Sys 
Squadron  
C-5 Sys 
Group 
C-130 Sys 
Group   
CV-22 Sys 
Squadron 
AC-130 
Sys 
Squadron
Comm 
Derivatives 
Sys 
Squadron 
MC-130 
Sys 
Squadron
B/S Sys  
Group 
SL&G Sys 
Squadron 
F-16 Sys  
Group 
B-1 Sys 
Group 
Combat 
Sys 
Squadron 
 
B-2 Sys  
Group 
F-15 
Sys 
Group 
F-117 
Sys  
Sqdn 
 F-35 Sys 
Pgm Ofc
J-UCAS 
Sys 
Pgm 
Ofc
Long 
Range 
Strike 
Sys Wing  
PEO – ASC/CC
Figure 6 ASC Reorganization Chart              (ASC, 2005)  
 
 Within ASC, interviews were performed at various levels.  The first interviews 
were with members of the ASC Commander’s Action Group (CAG).  The CAG is 
responsible for being the liaison between the Wings and DRGs and the Commander.  
They review documentation and generally make sure both the Commander is informed 
about the Wings/DRGs and the Wings/DRGs are informed about the concerns of the 
Commander.  The CAG was chose first in order to get an overall picture of the 
Commander’s requirements with respect to systems architecture.  For instance, does the 
Commander review the systems architecture products included in the programmatic 
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documentation that flows from the programs?  Also, the CAG provided connections 
within the Wings and DRGs for further interviews. 
 Within each Wing/DRG, the first interviews were conducted with senior program 
office personnel with program management and engineering responsibilities.  These 
leaders were a mix of active duty Air Force officers (Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and 
Colonels) and government civilians (GS-13, 14, 15, and SES).  These interviews were 
intended to provide an overview of the systems architecture work ongoing within the 
organization as a whole as well as the senior leader perspective on systems architecting in 
general.  When systems architecting work was indicated within specific programs within 
the organization, follow-up interviews were scheduled with the appropriate programmatic 
personnel.   
 The follow-up interviews concentrated on the specific program application of 
systems architecting.  Interviews were conducted with program managers, engineers, and 
other program office personnel.  These interviewees included a wide range of active duty 
Air Force officers, government civilians, and support contractors.  The focus of this 
sampling group was an in-depth review of the program status and any system architecture 
work ongoing or planned.  This group was also best suited to respond to questions 
dealing with education, training, and experience as they represent the “hands-on” 
architecture workforce. 
 Within ASC, three other groups were also interviewed in order to broaden the 
scope of the study to encompass the entire organization.  First, as part of the ASC 
reorganization a Capabilities Planning and Integration Directorate, ASC/XR was stood 
up.  This organization is intended to be the origin of new system development efforts 
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within ASC by coordinating the user’s initial capability requirements with the 
appropriate Wing or DRG.  Since this group has a program initiation function, they made 
likely candidates for architecture work.  The next two groups are related in their support 
function within ASC.  ASC/PM provides education and career management support to 
the program managers assigned to ASC, while ASC/EN performs the same function for 
the engineering personnel.  Both of these organizations had the potential to effect 
architectural implementation through their policy and standards and education roles.  The 
personnel interviewed in these organizations were government civilians in the grades of 
GS-13 and above. 
 Additionally, interviews were conducted with systems architecture and DoDAF 
subject matter experts.  In the course of reviewing the relevant literature with respect to 
systems architectures and the DoDAF, these experts’ names and contact information 
became available as resources for data collection.  The three experts interviewed were all 
government support contractors with vast experience in either systems architecting and/or 
the DoDAF, in particular.  These interviews (all conducted via e-mail) focused on 
gathering expert opinion on the current issues surrounding program office 
implementation of the DoDAF systems architecture framework.    
3.4  Data Analysis Methodology 
 This study involves an interpretational analysis methodology.  In Leedy, Gall et. 
al. describe this process as “examining the data for constructs, themes, and patterns that 
can be used to describe and explain the phenomenon studied” (30:158).  The 
phenomenon, in this case is the implementation of the DoDAF system architecting 
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framework within ASC.  The data collected provides information enabling “an inductive 
process of organizing data into categories and identifying patterns (relationships) among 
the categories” (McMillan & Schumacher quoted in 30: 165).  Combining these ideas, 
the analysis methodology for this study involves grouping like organizations in a three-
tiered scale in terms of level of architectural implementation and identifying overarching 
patterns of behavior with respect to systems architecting.  Representative quotes from 
interviewees were collected in order to support the characterization of each organization. 
 The interviews provide data with which to characterize each program, DRG, or 
Wing with respect to the level of systems architecting implementation.  The organizations 
can then be plotted on a continuum representing various levels of systems architecture 
implementation.  A generic continuum is presented in Figure 7.  This continuum will 
provide a graphical depiction of the number of organizations in each stage of systems 
architecture implementation.  This depiction, along with selected quotes and other data to 
clarify each organization’s placement on the continuum, should prove and could provide 
a baseline for further ASC architecture implementation as well as background for the 
development of version 2 of the DoDAF. 
 
 
 
 
 
Great Deal of 
Architecture 
Work In 
Organization 
Some 
Architecture 
Work In 
Organization 
No 
Architecture 
Work In 
Organization 
 The second portion of the analysis involves recognizing the overall themes and 
patterns of systems architecture behavior within ASC.  This data is culled from questions 
Figure 7 Architectural Implementation Continuum 
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dealing with the perceived value of systems architectures to acquisition program 
management as well as recommendations suggested by interviewees.  The results of this 
analysis will be presented in verbal form with representative quotes from the 
interviewees.   
3.5  Validity and Reliability 
 In a qualitative study such as this, there appears to be no “single, commonly 
accepted standard for judging the validity and reliability” (30:168), however this does not 
lessen the concerns with respect to ensuring these aspects of the study are maintained at a 
high level.  Validity deals with the effectiveness of the measure; does it measure what it 
is supposed to measure?  How comprehensively?  How accurately? (30:32).  Reliability 
deals with the consistency with which a measurement performs.  Does the instrument 
consistently measure the factors it was designed to?  Does it do so accurately (30:35)?  
Both issues are addressed below. 
 In Leedy, Altheide and Johnson refer to four types of ‘interpretive validity’ which 
can be used to judge the validity of qualitative research:  usefulness, contextual 
completeness, research positioning, and reporting style.  Usefulness involves the level to 
which the study “enlightens those who read it or moves those who were studied to 
action”.  Contextual completeness deals with how comprehensive the view of the 
situation is that is provided.  “Research positioning refers to researchers’ awareness of 
their own influences (both subtle and direct) in the research setting.”  These influences 
can include beliefs, values, and/or biases.  Finally, the reporting style employed by the 
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researcher can have an effect on the study’s overall credibility (30:168).  Steps taken to 
address each of these issues are described below. 
 With respect to usefulness, the ultimate determination can only be made some 
time after the study.  However, as no such study has been attempted previously, the 
results will inherently be enlightening to all intended audiences (i.e. the ASC Chief 
Architect, DoDAF Working Group, systems engineering community in general).  Even if 
the results confirm long-held beliefs as to the level of implementation of the architectural 
mindset, this study provides data and justification for those beliefs.  In terms of driving 
organizations to action, this study includes several recommendations in order to address 
any deficiencies in architectural implementation within ASC.  Again, the final 
determination will be made in how many, if any, of the recommendations are followed 
through. 
 Altheide and Johnson recommend the following measures to address contextual 
completeness: “including information about the history of the phenomenon; the physical 
setting; the activities, schedules, and routines of the participants; as well as their 
individual perceptions and meanings” (30:168).  This study deals with the issue of 
contextual completeness by capturing the evolution of the DoDAF and its expansion 
from C4ISR systems to all weapon systems development efforts.  Further, the physical 
setting in ASC, the activities of the personnel with systems architecture responsibilities, 
and their perceptions were captured as part of the data collection process.     
 The final two characteristics of validity deal with the researcher:  the researcher’s 
positioning and reporting style.  The beliefs, values, and biases of the researcher with 
respect to systems architecting and the DoDAF are presented in the Limitations section 
 44
of this chapter.  Full disclosure of any issues that may affect the credibility of this study 
is the goal.  In terms of reporting style, this study is presented with the researcher’s 
interpretations of interviewee views as expressed in the interviews conducted.  The 
overall findings and conclusions (i.e. the analysis) are based on these interpretations; 
following a triangulation methodology involving the collection of like statements from 
several interviewees, “similar themes are noted in data collected from a variety of 
sources” in order to increase credibility in the interpretations (30:169).  Where 
appropriate, to bolster the weight of the analysis, representative quotes pertaining to the 
subject matter are presented.  Finally, outlier analysis examined cases that differed 
markedly from the majority of situations investigated, identifying what was present or 
absent in these cases compared to the more common examples (30:169).    
 In addition to the triangulation method described above, Cooper identifies a 
number of different strategies researchers can employ to increase the reliability of their 
research designs (11:6).  Specifically, she recommends variety in data collection, which 
involves collecting data from a number of different locations or sources (11:12).  This 
technique is similar to the triangulation method described above and was accomplished 
by interviewing personnel with systems engineering (and presumably then, systems 
architecture) responsibilities at various organizations within ASC (e.g. Wings, DRGs, 
XR, CAG, PM, EN) and at different levels within these organizations.  Further, a detailed 
literature review pertaining to systems architecture in general, the DoDAF, and systems 
architectures within ASC, in particular, provided a variety of additional sources of 
information. 
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 The limitations of this study are common to qualitative studies employed in other 
disciplines and are tightly coupled with the researcher’s assumptions.  Specifically, the 
key limits to the completeness and accuracy of this study are access to the right people, 
the researcher’s positioning with respect to the topic of study, and the researcher’s ability 
to interpret and correctly portray the true state of systems architecting within ASC.  In 
terms of interviewee selection, the primary assumption was that starting with the Wing 
and DRG commanders and Directors of Engineering, other personnel with systems 
architecture responsibilities would be identified.  Although this occurred in many cases, 
there is a small chance someone with data pertaining to this study was not identified and 
therefore not interviewed.  With respect to the researcher’s positioning, one assumption 
was that most, if not all, organizations within ASC were involved in at least some level of 
systems architecture work.  This could lead to a limitation in terms of the data collected 
in the very first interviews.  Finally, the most significant potential limitation results from 
not having another research cross check the interview data in order to ensure the 
researcher’s ability to correctly analyze the data collected and display the actual state of 
affairs such that the reader has the same picture as the researcher. 
 Assumptions and limitations aside, the documented methodology suits the overall 
purpose of this study which is to provide a status of systems architectural implementation 
within ASC.  The data was collected through numerous interviews and grouped 
according to like themes/beliefs.  These groupings facilitated analysis of the data to 
determine the current state and also trends in systems architecture implementation within 
ASC.  The analysis leads to the derivation of significant findings and conclusions.  This 
analysis is described in Chapter 4.
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4.  Analysis and Findings 
4.1  Overview 
 
 Chapter 3 outlined the data collection and analysis methodology.  Data was 
collected through structured interviews intended to allow the identification of general 
groupings of architectural implementation and overall themes within ASC.  There are two 
types of analysis techniques at work.  First, there is the logical grouping of like 
organizations/groups on the continuum presented in Figure 7.  This grouping facilitated 
the second type: descriptions of the groups themselves.  Finally, the analysis leads to five 
findings of significance, four dealing directly with the research objective and a fifth 
having ancillary connection with the topic.  
4.2  Logical Grouping Along Implementation Continuum 
 
 As outlined in the previous chapter, this continuum provides a glance into the 
state of architectural implementation within ASC.  Based on similarities in 
responses/comments from interviewees, organizations were placed along the continuum 
indicating whether they performed “No Architecture Work”, “Some Architecture Work”, 
or a “Great Deal of Architecture Work”.  The placement of organizations interviewed is 
depicted in Figure 8 below.  The characteristics that distinguish each group are discussed 
in the next section. 
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 Figure 8 ASC Architecture Implementation Continuum 
 
 
 
 It is interesting to note that the organizations grouped on the left side of the 
continuum, the “No Architecture Work in Organization” section, are the Wings and 
Direct Reporting Groups within ASC.  However, systems within many of these 
organizations are grouped in the middle of the continuum, the “Some Architecture Work 
in Organization” section.  These groupings are highlighted in Figure 9 below. 
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 Figure 9 Annotated ASC Architecture Implementation Continuum 
 
In order to further depict this phenomenon, Figure 10 highlights the Long Range Strike 
Wing position on the continuum – specifically, to the left, while three of the systems or 
sub-organizations within the Wing are placed toward the right side of the continuum.  
This indicates that while senior leadership within an organization would respond that, at 
least “corporately”, there is little-to-no architecture work ongoing within the 
organization, there is indeed some, and in at least this particular case, a great deal of 
architecture work in progress.  This phenomenon is discussed further in the Findings 
sections. 
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Figure 10 ASC Corporate Inconsistency in Implementation Reporting 
 
4.3  Characteristics of the Three Groups of Organizations 
 
 Within each of the three groups identified in Figure 8, there are similar beliefs 
and behaviors that characterize each.  These similarities involve the level of 
understanding of the value of systems architectures within acquisition programs, the 
amount of exposure in terms of training and education in systems architectures, and the 
DoDAF in particular, and the different regulatory requirements levied upon them.  
Further, organizations/systems grouped within each category also often shared general 
acquisition program characteristics such as location in the acquisition development cycle 
(i.e. pre-Milestone A, Milestone B, Sustainment, etc.).  Each grouping is described below 
with a general explanation of the characteristics of the organizations in the group. 
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 Organizations in the “No Architecture Work” Category 
 Organizations in “No Architecture Work in Organization” category are most 
generally characterized as being legacy platforms operating under existing Operational 
Requirements Documents, as opposed to the newer JCIDS and DoD 5000 series 
operating instructions.  Organizations such as the Long Range Strike Wing with the B-1, 
B-2, and B-52, the Fighter Attack Wing with the F-15 and F-16, the Training Group with 
the T-1, T-6, and T-38, and the Special Operations Forces Group with their C-130 
variants all have systems predominantly in sustainment phase of development.  Further, 
these programs have capability “roadmaps” in lieu of integrated architectures to address 
future development options.  Also, the personnel assigned have virtually no training or 
experience with the DoDAF. 
 Organizations in the “Some Architecture Work” Category 
 Organizations in “No Architecture Work in Organization” category are 
characterized by new acquisition policy driving production of architecture views, 
architecture products created simply as an output of good systems engineering practice, 
and, at least in one case, a Major Command (MAJCOM) emphasis on integrated 
architectures.  These organizations create architecture products, in most cases, because 
they are required to manage information flows.  This is perhaps an indication of how 
architectures could become a part of the weapon systems acquisition process.  Program 
office personnel who otherwise may not have taken an interest in the DoDAF will gain 
exposure because of necessity.  The other two cases, organizations with above average 
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systems engineering practices and the MAJCOM driven architecture efforts represent 
special cases within this group. 
 In terms of the new acquisition policies, JCIDS, ISP, and NR-KPP requirements 
have lead some organizations to the creation of architecture products.  The B-1 Fully 
Integrated Data Link, B-2 Radar Modernization Program, and the Personnel Recovery 
Vehicle programs all created DoDAF products as a result of an approaching milestone 
decision review.  In this instance, the views were created by in-house personnel (either 
government employees or support contractors) with limited training which included the 
DAU Systems Architectures course, SYS 283, training on the Popkin System Architect 
tool, and DoDAF training through the Air Force Chief Architect’s office.  
 A second group driven by regulatory requirements involves programs creating 
ISPs and the need to address NR-KPP requirements.  The F-16 Link 16 program is facing 
testing through the Joint Interoperability Testing Center, which requires the production of 
an ISP, which in turn requires the production of architecture products.  Further, the C-17 
program has taken an even stranger trip to arrive at the need for architecture products.  
As a result of a recent Unit Compliance Inspection, the program was found to be lacking 
a Program Protection Plan (PPP).  The PPP requires an ISP as an annex.  And, of course, 
the ISP requires several DoDAF views.  Although one respondent stated, “In order to 
meet these (documentation requirements), you need to understand the architecture”, the 
views are predominantly created by contractors as the government personnel had no 
exposure to the DoDAF.  It is interesting to note that the programs facing a milestone 
turned to in-house personnel to create the architecture products, while those facing ISP 
requirements outsourced the creation of the documents. 
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 Two special cases are included in this group:  organizations that create 
architectures as a part of good systems engineering practice, and organizations working 
together with their MAJCOM on integrated architectures.  Organizations in the first 
category include the Global Mobility Wing, the Joint Strike Fighter avionics 
organization, and the F/A-22 program.  These organizations are not necessarily driven by 
JCIDS, but have been performing systems engineering with a great deal of rigor and 
would be able to produce DoDAF products simply as a byproduct.  Finally, the other 
organization in this category enjoys a relationship with their MAJCOM where the 
MAJCOM emphasizes integrated architectures.  The Air Mobility Command drives 
Global Mobility Wing efforts through architecture products created in their A-6 
organization. 
 Organizations in the “A Great Deal of Architecture Work” Category 
 Organizations in “Great Deal of Architecture Work in Organization” category are 
characterized by an emphasis on future systems/capabilities, having embraced the 
benefits of systems architecting, and having personnel with significant experience in 
systems engineering, and to some extent, trained in the DoDAF.  ASC can be generally 
characterized as having many programs that have been in development for a long time 
(F-15, B-52, C-130, and even the F/A-22).  However, the truly new capabilities and 
systems that are coming into ASC for development include the Airborne Electronic 
Attack (AEA) capability and the Tanker Modernization Squadron.  These 
capabilities/systems originate in ASC with the ASC/XR Capabilities Planning 
organization.  ASC/XR also deploys personnel throughout the Wings and DRGs as 
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liaisons for introducing new development efforts.  Certainly these organizations have a 
regulatory reason to perform system architecting, however, they have also simply 
embraced the benefits of systems architecting to acquisitions.  They are not alone 
however, as the B-2 Group has also bought into the positive aspects of systems 
architecting within their organization – and further, the use of the DoDAF.  All of the 
organizations in this group are characterized by personnel having significant experience 
in systems engineering, and to some extent, trained in the DoDAF.  
 The three groupings and the information underlying the placement of each 
organization within the groups lead to five significant findings.  The first four relate 
directly to the research question and objective – what is the state of DoDAF system 
architecture implementation within ASC.  The last finding, although not directly 
answering the research question, is closely related; dealing with the transition from 
system oriented to capability-based weapon system acquisition processes within ASC.  
These findings are described below. 
4.4  Findings 
 The data collection and analysis process lead the recognition of five findings: 
 1. ASC organizations are not doing much architecture work “corporately”. 
 2. If the organization isn’t developing a new capability or doesn’t have an ‘X’ in 
 their office symbol, they are not likely doing any architecture work. 
 3. There is no consensus among ASC personnel as to the benefit of systems 
 architectures to acquisition program management. 
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 4. The leadership and organizations attempting to instill an architectural mindset 
 in ASC programs are not succeeding. 
 5. The transformation to a capabilities-based weapon system acquisition process 
 is not complete. 
Each finding is detailed below with a general description followed by representative 
comments from interviewees. 
 Finding One:  ASC organizations are not doing much architecture work 
 “corporately”. 
 
 Six of the seven Wings/DRGs (or 85.7%) are only doing “Some” or “No” 
architecture work.  There is no high-level acceptance of system architectures, as indicated 
through interviews with the Commander’s Program Execution Group as well as the 
senior leaders of each of the Wings and DRGs.  Although the senior leaders interviewed 
indicated little to no architecture work ongoing, there were cases where organizations or 
programs within the corporate organization were creating architecture products due to 
regulatory or other requirements (recall the Long Range Strike Wing example in Figure 
10).  Many organizations are contracting for their architecture development because they 
felt the expertise/knowledge/experience is not resident in ASC organically. 
 Comments representative of this finding include: 
 - “The Center is not really taking advantage of architectures”. 
 - “Lack of architecting work has a lot to do with the work and how it gets to 
 ASC”.  That is, in platform chunks via Program Management Directives – the old 
 acquisition standby: funding and requirements. 
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 - One interviewee identified the lack of implementation as essentially 
 “pragmatism”, believing program office personnel have distinct direction 
 (funding and requirements again), which are difficult enough to achieve without 
 the additional burden of systems architecting. 
 - Most of systems engineering work is done by contractors…”we have no one left 
 in ASC to do it”. 
 Finding Two:  If the organization isn’t developing a new capability or doesn’t 
 have an ‘X’ in their office symbol, they are not likely doing any architecture 
 work. 
 
 This finding involves two groups – those with an ‘X’ in their office symbol 
(ASC/XR and the Wing/DG XR offices) and the rest of ASC.  The ‘rest’ of ASC is 
predominantly described above in Finding One.  The organizations with an ‘X’ in their 
office symbol are focused on new capabilities and systems development.  However, even 
within this group, members still lack the training and experience to use their architecture 
products as a systems engineering and capability-based analysis decision-making tool. 
Within those who do make use of architectures, there are three groups.  The first, group 
includes organizations working on new systems and either required to under JCIDS 
documentation requirements or see the value added (XRs, new programs like AEA and 
Tanker Modernization).  The second, and most exclusive group is those who create the 
products (or more appropriately, could create the products if required) as a result of 
rigorous application of systems engineering practices (Global Recon Wing, etc.).  And 
finally, the largest group of organizations that make use of architectures are those 
directed to (programs/organizations such as the C-17, B-2 RMP, and F-16 Link). 
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 The organizations making use of the architectures due to seeing the value added 
are described in greater detail later in this chapter.  Specifically, the AEA, Tanker 
Modernization Squadron, and B-2 Group are highlighted as Success Stories.  Details 
pertaining to these organizations are included later.  However, below are representative 
comments dealing with the rationale behind the organizations without the ’X’ in their 
office symbols are not using architectures. 
 - “Can’t very well change the architecture of a legacy system”. 
 - Bottom Line:  “Putting these requirements on sustainment systems is a waste”. 
 - Program managers are too busy putting “rubber on the ramp”. 
 Finding Three:  There is no consensus among ASC personnel as to the benefit 
 of systems architectures to acquisition program management. 
 
 It is clear from the respondents there is no consensus as to the value of systems 
architecting within acquisition program offices, at least as far as ASC is concerned.  
There are some that see them as a benefit in terms of a tool in the system engineer’s 
toolbox.  While others believe program offices are not the real users of the architecture 
products.  Still others believe the products and process are too complex.  Finally, there 
are many who believe there are issues with the products themselves. 
 For those who see system architectures as a benefit in terms of as a tool in the 
system engineer’s toolbox, representative comments include: 
 - Architectures are a good communications tool to HQ (the people who integrate 
 systems). 
 - The Systems and Technical Views are what provide value to program offices. 
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 - The TV-1 is an important product that establishes the standards with which the 
 rest of development work will be based upon.  
 - These products would really benefit complicated commands like Air Combat 
 Command and Special Operations Command, where complex interactions and 
 connectivity are the norm. 
 The organizations who believe program offices are not the users of the 
architecture products, had this to say: 
 - The concept (systems architectures) exists at an Air Force level such that it has 
 not resulted in funding and requirements outside platforms.  In other words, the 
 program offices are given a program to execute and the architectures should be 
 included when the acquisition effort starts. 
 - A lot of this stuff is “too high level”. 
 - There is “No advocacy at worker-bee level in SPO for architectures”. 
 - Acquisition personnel need good examples; a “poster child”. 
 The third sub-finding dealing with a lack of consensus within ASC revolves 
around a belief that the products and process of systems architecting are too complex.  
Comments in support of this belief include: 
 - Architecture products are “Complex, time-consuming, and expensive”. 
 - They are “labor and intellect-intensive matters”. 
 - There is a danger in creating something so “cumbersome” that it is too abstract 
 in the mainstream of the management of the program. 
 And the final sub-finding in this area deals with what respondents consider issues 
with the DoDAF products themselves.  Representative comments include: 
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 - The “views are not well defined”. 
 - “See a lot of people running around creating products that are not really 
 integrated”. 
 - Many products lack description of timing and latency. 
 - We need a consistent approach for the implementation of the views into the 
 modeling and simulation environments.  Specifically, they need to be translated 
 into dynamic system-of-system operations research models and we have to be 
 able to tie OVs & SVs together into an executable models that are good for 
 management and operational assessments (trade-offs, impacts, what ifs, etc.). 
 Finding Four:  The leadership and organizations attempting to instill an 
 architectural mindset are not succeeding. 
 
 This finding deals with attempts by the leadership and organizations who are 
attempting to instill an architectural mindset.  According to the interviewees, these 
organizations and leaders are not succeeding.  Comments in support of this assessment 
include: 
 - “Death by viewgraph” or, “in the ether frequently”.  There is a belief that these 
 organizations are really good at putting together Power Point presentations, but 
 that the material is over the audiences heads. 
 - With respect to the position of ASC Chief Architect; most interviewees didn’t 
 know who the Chief Architect was – and, in some cases, that ASC even had one. 
 - The ASC/XR (Capabilities Planning Division) plays a leading role in 
 capabilities-based analysis and planning (with architectural pieces to both), but 
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 interviewees believed they may not have ability to do what we need to have done 
 with respect to systems of systems development planning; specifically the trades, 
 etc. that keep the product center from getting user-directed solutions. 
 - Finally, the ASC Program Management home office, ASC/PM and the ASC 
 Engineering home office, ASC/EN, have responsibilities to train and equip the 
 program managers and engineers that populate the program offices.  With respect 
 to systems architectures, there is no formal training program for program 
 managers and engineers.   
  -- Engineers can volunteer for a systems engineering certification program 
  through the Air Force Institute of Technology that includes  a course on  
  systems architecting.  However, they self-nominate themselves (i.e. there  
  is no selection and nomination process), there are no positions within ASC 
  that are identified as requiring this certification, and, at least in the past  
  year (2004), there were only four engineers participating in the program. 
 Finding Five:  The transformation to a capabilities-based weapon system 
 acquisition process is not complete. 
 
 The previous four findings dealt directly with the research topic of investigating 
the state of systems architecting within ASC.  This last finding, although no less 
significant in terms of voracity (as it was apparent from the number of interviewees who 
shared this belief that it was worth reporting), does not tie directly into the research 
objective.  It deals with the adoption of a capability-based acquisition process within 
ASC.  This shift from requirements- and platform-based acquisition is fundamental to the 
new JCIDS process and therefore subject to similar growing pains in terms of integration 
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into the standard mode of operation as is systems architectures.  Indeed the two concepts 
appear to be following similar paths, at least up to this point within ASC.  Comments that 
elucidate this finding are below. 
 - “I have a user that doesn’t know what a capability is – they want a system”.  
 - Net-centricity and capabilities-based development has not found its way into the 
 infrastructure. 
 - With respect to the notion of a ‘Capability Manager (CM)’ where the CM 
 allocates requirement to system; system responsible to make trade-offs to meet 
 multiple capabilities; some thought that this was a dangerous concept if they are 
 not responsible to deliver anything. 
 - Also, there was concern about the way we manage capabilities/programs? 
  -- Bottom-Up (systems perspective) to fill capability gaps, or 
  -- Top-Down (capabilities-wise) with multiple systems to meet capability  
  needs? 
 These findings represent the complete results of the analysis performed of the 
data collected during this study.  Four of the findings provide direct support for 
answering the research questions, while the fifth provides useful commentary on an 
ancillary and related topic.  Although the tone of the findings presented indicated a lack 
of architecture work within the product center, there are some who are making it work.  
Specifically, the AEA, B-2 Group, and Tanker Modernization Squadrons would have to 
be considered success stories in terms of adopting systems architecture, and the DoDAF 
mindset. 
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4.5  Success Stories 
 While collecting data for this study, three organizations stood out as having 
successfully applied systems architecture within their sphere of weapon system 
development.  These organizations arrived at their acceptance of architectures, and the 
DoDAF, in different manners, but all represent the leading edge in terms of architectural 
integration.  AEA is a capability that is being managed as such.  The Capability Manager 
believes systems architectures are vital to the success of a capability management effort.  
The B-2 Group first encountered architectures as part of a milestone preparation exercise 
for the Radar Modernization Program, but have since found the DoDAF to be a continued 
useful tool.  Finally, the Tanker Modernization Squadron also started off without the aid 
of system architectures, but eventually was directed to take a capability delivery 
approach.  Each of these is discussed further. 
 Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) 
 As mentioned above, AEA is not a single program, but rather a capability.  At this 
point, the organization is ‘prototyping’ the Capability Management concept.  The AEA 
Capability Manager (CM) actually has his own Program Element which allows control of 
the funding for all aspects of providing this capability.  The CM provides funding and 
requirements to the appropriate Wings/DRGs.  The AEA capability is intended to provide 
support to strike forces, initially in a high threat/limited access environment.  The AEA 
architecture contains multiple systems including the B-52, E-18, and the Joint Unmanned 
Combat Aerial System (J-UCAS).  In fact, the CM believes that “architectures are key to 
successful capability management”. 
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 B-2 Group 
 The B-2 Group within the Long Range Strike Wing took a unique path to full 
systems architecture acceptance.  Initially the B-2 Group faced a Milestone B decision 
for the B-2 Radar Modernization Program (RMP).  Since Milestone B requires the 
creation of a CDD, the program office was required to create architecture views.  
However, during the effort of creating the products for the CDD, the effort blossomed 
into a B-2 enterprise-wide architecture effort. 
 The program office personnel realized the value to the program of adopting 
architectural methodology, and specifically believed it would be faster to do it right 
(following DoDAF) than to fight it --- and their key is speed.  The Group sees 
architectures as a “lingua franca to go from operational requirements to systems 
specifications” and maintain information consistency.  They hope to develop a consistent 
lexicon of speech from requirements through implementation.  Another positive aspect of 
the B-2 Group’s architectural implementation is their cooperation with the MAJCOM 
customer.  They are working hand-in-hand with ACC/DRA2 (the B-2 requirements 
office), who buys in to the value of architectures as well. 
 Tanker Modernization Squadron 
 
 The Tanker Modernization Squadron within the Global Mobility Wing is a pre-
Milestone B capability development organization looking into replacing the aging fleet of 
KC-135 air refueling aircraft.  This effort began originally as KC-767 Program (the 
infamous) Tanker Lease program.  At the early stages, any architecture work completed 
by the people in the program was essentially “square-filling”.  However, when the 
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program was “paused” for political reasons, the program office regrouped and began 
looking at the requirement from a capability perspective.  They were initially driven to 
architectures by interoperability and information assurance concerns, but have embraced 
architectures as a capability development tool.  Just as the B-2 Group, the Tanker 
Modernization Squadron is doing it right – working with the MAJCOM on capability-
based development; AMC has contracted for the development of the Tanker-X CDD.  
Both the MAJCOM and the Tanker Modernization Squadron believe this early 
involvement, coupled with the use of systems architectures, provides an “opportunity to 
get on top of requirements generation process.” 
 These three organizations, along with the XR organizations represent the cutting 
edge of architectural implementation within ASC.  They represent the exception, 
however, not the rule.  As mentioned earlier, 87% of the Wings/DRGs reported only 
some or no architecture work.  The data collected in this study lead to the additional 
findings that there is no consensus within ASC on the value of systems architecting and 
the leadership attempting to incorporate architectures into ASC acquisitions is not 
succeeding.  Further, the interviewees indicated an additional finding concerning the 
slow pace of the transformation to effective capabilities-based acquisition.  The JCIDS 
process is intended to create this process, and systems architectures are intended to aid in 
the execution of this process.  Unfortunately at this point, despite the regulatory 
requirements to create architecture products, the program managers and engineers within 
ASC are not reaping the intended benefits of systems architectures within their programs.
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5.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1  Overview 
 
 This study examined the level to which ASC has implemented systems 
architectures within their weapon systems development efforts.  The literature indicates 
there are real benefits to be had for acquisition program office personnel.  In addition, 
guidance has been instituted calling for the use of system architectures, specifically the 
DoDAF products.  Despite the benefits and the guidance, there are roadblocks to the 
successful implementation within ASC.  Based on a robust data collection and analysis 
methodology, five critical findings were identified.  These findings provide the 
justification for the two conclusions outlined below. 
5.2  Conclusions 
 
 Recall the specific research question this study set out to answer, How are 
systems architectures, and the DoDAF specifically, being implemented “in the trenches” 
of USAF weapons systems acquisitions?  This study focused the investigation in 
answering this question on ASC.  The data collected point to two conclusions. 
1.  While programs required to follow new acquisition processes are doing so, 
very few are employing systems architectures systematically. 
2.  At this point, at least within ASC, the benefits derived from an 
architectural context are not yet being realized.   
 
5.3  Recommendations 
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 The findings provide evidence for the following recommendations offered in 
satisfaction of the research objective.  There are recommendations for ASC, for the 
DoDAF Working Group, and for the systems engineering community in general.  
Ultimately, these groups should determine the goal of incorporating systems architectures 
within weapon systems acquisitions and the follow-up with a level of commitment to 
back up the decision. 
1.  Lead by the ASC Chief Architect, ASC leadership should clearly 
determine goals for systems architecting.  For instance, if it is a valuable tool that 
every Wing and DRG should have in their toolkit, then the Chief Architect should come 
up with architecture standards and then publicize/indoctrinate the program managers and 
engineers within the center.  And the chief engineers within each Wing and DRG 
(spearheaded by ASC/EN) should take lead in developing architectural mindset within 
organization.  These organizations should also act as conduit to make the high-level 
(often esoteric) guidance relevant to program office personnel concerned with 
cost/schedule/performance. 
2.  The ASC architectural leadership should select an exemplar case as a 
practical example of how systems architectures can be applied to capability 
management.  This would provide other program offices the example many are 
clamoring for.  Further, a more comprehensive training program should be instituted 
within the center starting at the “See Dick create an architecture” level.  Several training 
opportunities already exist:  AFIT SENG 640 course, DAU SYS 283 course, Aerospace 
 66
Corporation Systems Arch. Course, etc.  The leadership should continue the current 
practice of using ASC Focus Week as means of “getting the word out”. 
 3.  The Architecture Working Group (AWG) should incorporate these 
findings to improve DoDAF Version 2.0 products in support of capabilities-based 
acquisition.  The data collected and presented in this study are intended to aid them in 
making the DoDAF more of a tool for acquisition program office personnel.  One 
imperative is for the AWG to make the case for architectures as systems engineering and 
program management tool.  Capture the examples of successful implementation, AEA/B-
2/Tanker Replacement within ASC – but also any others from other product centers or 
services for that matter, as case studies with practical examples for others to follow.  
Together with the systems engineering community in general, find some way to address 
issues raised in Finding #3 above concerning the products themselves; timing and 
latency, how to address complex, dynamic systems/capabilities with static views. 
 4.  The systems engineering community (SAF/AQ, ASC/EN, Chief Engineers, 
CSE, OSD/OSSE) should also develop/integrate a syntax and methodology for 
DoDAF views to be made executable.  This effort should be more than just to determine 
if the architectures will work, but to allow for the development of measures of 
performance in order to compare architectures to one another for tradeoff purposes.  It is 
this ability, to dynamically simulate a proposed architecture and evaluate the measures of 
effectiveness output, which provides the ultimate value to capability-based weapon 
systems acquisition efforts. 
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5.4  Recommendations for Further Study 
 
 During the course of this study, several additional areas of interest were 
identified, where further study could be of value to decision-makers.  An obvious 
extension of this study is to evaluate the other Air Force product centers – and even 
investigate the state of architectural implementation within the other services acquisition 
programs.  As previously mentioned, the success stories within ASC should be studied in 
greater detail in order to produce case studies that could serve as justification for the 
skeptical and a notional ‘how-to’ for those looking for an example to follow.  Also a 
recurring theme throughout this study is the call for executable architectures.  Efforts 
should be made in the engineering and research communities to develop techniques for 
the dynamic analysis of architectural products.  Two additional recommended areas of 
study are capability management as a construct and the Air Force Materiel Command 
reorganization.  Both areas are in their infancy, in that they are recent changes to the way 
of doing business, however careful study as these concepts mature would benefit Air 
Force acquisitions. 
 The first recommendation, in terms of additional study, is to reproduce this study 
at other product centers to determine if ASC is out front of the systems architecture 
implementation curve.  How are the other centers, Air Armament Center (AAC), 
Electronic Systems Center (ESC), and Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) coming 
along in their implementation of systems architectures within acquisition program 
management?  It would seem notionally that ESC would be in front due to their exposure 
to the CAF since 1996, but is that the case?  Also, SMC follows the space-specific 
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guidance of the NSS 03-01, which calls for architecture products as part of process; but 
how are they doing? 
 The acquisition community would greatly benefit from case studies documenting 
successful lessons learned concerning system architectures.  Specifically, an AEA 
Capability Management Case Study would have value no matter how successful this 
foray into capability management is.  If it works and the capability is delivered to the 
warfighter in a timely and cost-effective manner, this could be a model for other 
“capability management” scenarios to follow.  If it doesn’t work, then the focus of the 
case study could be “how could such a seemingly good idea fail?”  In either case, the 
DoD is moving towards a capability-based development system, and as the Air Force’s 
first true capability management effort, AEA bears close study. 
 The need to evaluate methods to make the DoDAF views executable has been 
identified repeatedly in this study.  There are tools, such as VITECH’s CORE that allow 
the system engineer to “run” the architecture.  However, at this point, this analysis only 
provides the answer to the question, “does the architecture modeled work”?  This is truly 
an important question, as it is much better to find that the design is missing key 
interactions in a modeling arena as opposed to when you have built hardware and are 
testing.  The next step, however is the ability to measure how well each architecture 
performs, not just that it works. 
 Closely related to the study of the AEA capability management effort would be to 
further explore the idea of Capability Management altogether.  For instance, what exactly 
constitutes capability management?  What differentiates between program management 
and capability management competencies?  Further, who are capability managers; what 
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training/experience/knowledge are required?  Where do they fit organizationally (product 
center, AFMC headquarters, MAJCOMs, USAF CONOPs)?  What about funding and 
control of schedules to synchronize capability releases?  This is an area ripe for study.  
Perhaps investigating how similar efforts are done in industry. 
– The final recommendation for additional study would be to evaluate the 
effectiveness of AFMC reorganization.  This is a recent change to how AFMC does 
business and was done to accomplish specific goals.  The study could be a case study 
investigating the pros and cons of Wing/Group/Squadron organization, measuring 
progress against the stated goals of the reorganization effort.  Does this structure really 
make it easier to relate to customer?  Does the new structure increase cross-enterprise 
integration?  ASC is the first product center to implement this reorganization, but the 
other AFMC product centers are also reorganizing this way. 
 ASC is, as part of the overall DoD acquisition transformation effort, in a period of 
change.  The aim is for a more top-down, capabilities-based weapon system process 
where all services developed by each service interact to produce the effects combatant 
commanders require to meet the national security objectives.  The DoDAF provides a 
proposed framework for the development of architectural products in support of the kind 
of analysis required to make this vision happen.  However, at least at this point in ASC, 
the architectures have not been integrated into the everyday operations of the acquisition 
program office personnel charged with managing the development of new capabilities.
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